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BOOK REVIEW
James Atwood and
Kingman Brewster. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD.

Co., 1981. Two-volume text. Pp. 359 and 355. Reviewed by Joel
Davidow*
International antitrust is one of the gourmet specialties on the
menu of United States law. The combination of competition law,
international law, and patent law, spiced with complex diplomatic
and trade issues as well as a dash of foreign flavor, is irresistible
to the connoisseur. The proof: even though few law schools offer a
separate course in international antitrust law and few lawyers
deal with the subject regularly, articles, hornbooks, and even treatises are produced in this area with amazing frequency. It even
appears that expensive texts are purchased in substantial
numbers.
Four texts have appeared in the last decade. Wilbur Fugate's
Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws was published in 1973
and An InternationalAntitrust Primer by Kintner and Joelson
was published in 1974. Professor Hawk of Fordham Law School
produced United States, Common Market and InternationalAntitrust in 1979, followed by the Atwood-Brewster two volume text
in 1981. Authors of such texts face difficult choices when selecting
and organizing the legal materials to be presented. The heart of
the book usually deals with "the international application of
United States antitrust law." That concept, however, is difficult
to define or segregate. Is every case involving some conduct
abroad, a foreign firm, or imported goods an international case?
Are the rules governing international, transactions significantly
different from those applicable to domestic ones? No, but interesting arguments may be made about how much difference does,
or should, exist.1 The author initially must set out some basic an* Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie & Alexander, New York, New York. Formerly

Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, United States Department of
Justice; A.B. 1960, Princeton; LL.B. 1963, Columbia.
1. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 7 (2d ed. 1981); E. KINTER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
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titrust rules, but these must be abbreviated lest the book duplicate those on domestic antitrust law. Atwood and Brewster chose
to assume that the reader is acquainted with basic United States
antitrust law.
The Atwood-Brewster book's extensive introduction is a major
virtue. For over a hundred pages, the authors survey the history
of United States international antitrust enforcement, its relation
to the rules of international trade, its current applications, and
the policy issues relating to United States national interests and
foreign relations. They argue persuasively that the recent Organi-

zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and uranium
cases, foreign blocking statutes, and United Nations codes of conduct for enterprises indicate that international antitrust issues
have become too important to be considered by academics and
government specialists alone. The authors point to six significant
bills currently before Congress as indicative of the topic's
importance.2
Atwood and Brewster chose to set out, in an orderly manner,
what the rules of international antitrust are before prescribing
what the rules ought to be. They did this in an admirably clear,
sensible, and well-organized way. The treatment, however, is
more like an analytic text than a casebook or a.full treatise. Many
important decisions are not quoted or analyzed in depth, dissenting positions are sometimes not mentioned, and the notes are
often more pinpointed or suggestive than comprehensive. Nevertheless, certain key topics are discussed fully. Most rules, the rationales supporting them, and the policy positions of the enforcement agencies are explained and analyzed with great accuracy
and understanding of the policy choices involved. A reader could
feel confident that he has read enough in their few succinct pages
on a topic to understand it and predict most results accurately.
Still, the scholar or active practitioner might find it desirable to
have another book, such as the Hawk treatise, 3 for fuller treatment of the cases and precedents on particular topics.

"International antitrust" treatises frequently include a review
or detailed description of the antitrust laws of other countries. In
260-72 (1974); Maw, United States Antitrust Law Abroad-The
Enduring Problem of Extraterritoriality,40 ANTITRUST L.J. 796 (1971).
2. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 1 n.7.
TRUST PRIMER

3.
TRUST

B.

HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-

(1979).
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the Hawk text, this results in a somewhat unbalanced presentation in which the international application of United States antitrust laws is contrasted with a complete survey of Common Market antitrust law. The Atwood-Brewster solution is to select a few
interesting principles from foreign antitrust laws without attempting to describe those laws or regulatory systems in detail.4
Most texts also include a discussion of Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) or United Nations antitrust resolutions and codes of conduct. Though these international declarations have proliferated in recent years, they clearly
lack the force of law. The United States in particular has insisted
that the word "voluntary" or an appropriate synonym be included
in each code or resolution. It is therefore arguable that such international declarations should be examined in depth by students of
political science rather than by practicing lawyers. Nevertheless,
it is possible that international codes gradually can form a body
of "soft law" which influences the behavior of states and enterprises, affects the discretionary rulings of some courts, and gradually alters or supplements customary international law. Moreover,
a number of the codes create committees, notification and consultation procedures, and technical assistance programs that have or
will have fairly immediate and practical effects. 5 The AtwoodBrewster book devotes a thoughtful chapter to this emerging
topic, "The International Law of Antitrust" as they dub it. They
conclude that these nonbinding rules will influence national legislation and will elicit some cooperation from multinational corporations. For these reasons, they conclude that these rules are worthy of close study by lawyers.6
In addition to the difficult problems involved in determining
what aspects of the law should be described under the rubric of
"international antitrust law," the authors of these texts also must
decide what, if anything, to prescribe. Though generally pro-antitrust and pro-United States in assumption and orientation, the
Fugate text is almost devoid of policy prescription.7 The Hawk
4. See, e.g., J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 4.02 (differences in
enforcement administration).
5. See, e.g., UNCTAD, The Set of Multi-Laterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/

RBP/CONF/10 (1980)(Provision G) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD CODE].
6. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, ch. XIII.
7. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST

LAWS (1973).
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book takes approximately the same approach, though the author
occasionally offers a comment indicating disagreement with a particular decision or sympathy for a particular approach.8 The
Atwood-Brewster book, following the tradition of its 1958 predecessor 9 (written by Brewster alone), devotes a very substantial
segment to policy analysis and advice. 10
There can be no doubt that the application of United States
antitrust laws to international transactions remains highly controversial. At least six legislative proposals are now pending before
the United States Congress to change that application in some
way, or to create a commission for further study."' Many of these
proposals have a reasonable chance of success. At the same time,
at least a dozen OECD countries have legislation designed to keep
antitrust information out of the United States or otherwise to
limit United States international antitrust enforcement. 2 Extraterritorial application of antitrust law also has been a subject of
United Nations examination and debate.1 3
It should be recognized, however, that all criticisms of United
States international antitrust law by no means cut in the same
direction. 14 The typical argument of business interests in the
United States is that United States antitrust law is too hard on
United States firms and hampers their ability to compete successfully in international markets. 5 The typical position of European
8. See supra note 3.

9. K.

BREWSTER, ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD (1958).
10. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, §§ 2.02, .14, .17, 3.18, .19, .26.
11. See id. § 1 n.7.
12. See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgments (restriction of enforcement) 1979
AusTL. ACTS P. No. 13; Law pertaining to the disclosure of documents and information of an economic, commercial, industrial, or technical nature to foreign,
natural, or juristic persons, Law No. 80-538, 1980 D.S.L. 285 (Fr.); Evidence
amendment law (No. 2) 1980 (N. Z.); Protection of Trading Interests Act, The
Law Reports, 1980, Part I, ch. 11, p. 243 (U.K.).
13. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER
COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

14.

(1979); UNCTAD CODE, supra note 5.
See

PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTI-

(J. Griffen ed. 1979).
15. See, e.g., Hearings on International Aspects of Antitrust Laws Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. & 2d Sess. 1416 (1975). The Hearings included a study
by the National Association of Manufacturers. That study revealed that 70% of
the firms responding to a questionnaire prepared by the National Association of
TRUST AND OTHER LAWS
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businesses is that United States antitrust law is too hard on
them, and should not apply to them at all regarding conduct committed abroad."' Some members of Congress believe that United
States antitrust law is not tough enough on foreign cartels, such
as the uranium cartel or OPEC, and that the law should be
changed to weaken the "act of state" or sovereign immunity de17
fenses that usually are available to defendants in cartel cases.
Finally, developing countries argue that it is inappropriate for the
United States to exempt or encourage export cartels aimed at
them, or to fail to discipline its multinational corporations when
they engage in restrictive business practices in the Third World. s
Atwood and Brewster negotiate this welter of confusing, contradictory, and often unsupported and unsound contentions with
considerable sanity and moderation. Initially, they observe that
there is a fairly persuasive case for leaving United States international antitrust law just about the way it is.19 At the last moment,

however, they consider the weight of events, or the depth of displeasure, to require some changes. There are three particular
changes they favor. The first, which can be traced back to Brewster's 1958 book, is that the Alcoa2" effects test for United States
antitrust jurisdiction be modified by a "rule of reason" or "balancing test."21 They conclude that such an approach is being
Manufacturers indicated their belief that United States antitrust laws had impaired their ability to compete in international markets. Their concerns included the inability to respond to challenges from foreign cartels, intergovernmental friction over antitrust enforcement, and uncertainty regarding the scope
of antitrust laws as applied to foreign trade. But see J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
supra note 1, § 17.27.
16. See generally United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information
Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (activities of a
Swiss corporaton found to be in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. III 1976)); J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 4.
17. See S. 2724, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.2486, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); S. 2395, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see also J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
supra note 1, § 5 n.133.
18. See Davidow, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law in a
Changing World, 8 L. & POL'Y ININT'L Bus. 895 (1976).
19. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 18.03.
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
Alcoa court concluded that United States antitrust law applied to foreign agreements that were intended to affect, and did affect, United States imports and
exports. Id. at 443-44.
21. J. ATWOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, §§ 18.28, 19.05.
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adopted voluntarily by the courts in Timberlane,2 2 Mannington
Mills, 3 and subsequent cases and thus that no legislation in this
area is necessary. 24 They note also that the Justice Department
has adopted a similar approach in its policy statements.2 Some
serious caveats and qualifications seem necessary before concluding that the balance test approach is new, workable, and capable
of solving more problems than it creates. Certainly the Justice
Department as a prosecutorial agency, in consultation with the
State Department and other interested agencies or parties, should
consider the degree of government involvement-foreign or domestic-in an international transaction, the effect of the prosecution on important interests of the United States, and the likelihood that foreign reaction may hamper or even nullify attempts
to achieve the purposes of the prosecution. This was good policy

before the Antitrust Guide of 19776 was published, and it remains good policy.27 It seems doubtful that there is much new
policy here, although there may be somewhat better communication and articulation of standards. In judicial decisions, however,
the utility of the balancing test is not so clear cut. Without witnesses from the State Department, courts are both reluctant and
ill-equipped to weigh or evaluate foreign interests. 2 Even when
they do, it is not quite clear how the balancing test or jurisdictional rule of reason adds to the existing legal defenses of sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign compulsion. Furthermore,
the balancing test allows the court to accommodate foreign interests that are too weak to qualify under the specific legal
defenses.29
The second recommendation calls for the Justice Department
and other prosecutorial or regulatory agencies dealing with for-

22. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
23. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
24. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 6.11.
25. Id. § 6.11 & n.105.

26.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST

GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

27. See, e.g., W.
§ 15.7 (3d ed. 1982).

(rev. ed. 1977).

FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

28. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. In. 1979).
29. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 6; Davidow, Extraterri-

torial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500, 512-14
(1981).
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eign offenses to "clear" their investigations and prosecutions with
the State Department." This point seems pass6 with respect to
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission,
which have been notifying, clearing through, and consulting with
the State Department since 1961. If the suggestion is that greater
deference should be accorded to the State Department's opinions,
this writer would be skeptical of its wisdom. The State Department is better able to protect itself from foreign pressure and
public or congressional criticism when it adheres to the position
that it can inform prosecutors about foreign government involvement and positions, but that it cannot, absent instruction by the
President in a matter involving the national interest, control law
enforcement. The other, more attractive aspect of this recommendation is that agencies other than the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission-such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission-should notify and consult with State regarding matters
involving foreign government interests. The need for such coordination is demonstrated by the fact that the first use by the British government of its new "anti-antitrust" blocking statute was
against a Commodities Futures Trading Commission investigation
seeking documents relating to silver trading on the London exchange. A new American Bar Association committee on extraterritoriality also has recommended expansion of consultation to include agencies in addition to the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission. 31 It seems likely that this AtwoodBrewster proposal soon will become a reality.
The authors' final recommendation is that the Sherman Act be
amended to "clarify" the position that United States antitrust jurisdiction is limited.2 Curiously, after considering a number -of
possible approaches, the authors end up favoring one that is
likely to satisfy no one fully. Some United States business groups
would support an amendment stating that the antitrust laws do
not apply abroad. Atwood and Brewster decline to go that far.

Many foreigners would favor an amendment making the law-or
at least its private treble damage provisions-inapplicable to foreign conduct by foreigners. Atwood and Brewster propose almost
precisely the opposite: that an amendment clarify that the law is

30. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 19.07.
31. ABA Recommendation 101A (1981).
32. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, §§ 7.02-.10.
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fully applicable to penalize foreigners acting abroad who injure
United States interests3 3 but cannot be applied to protect foreigners injured by United States businesses. Expressing some dislike

for the Webb-Pomerene Act,34 the authors would simply substitute an amendment that does approximately the same thing, but
without requiring registration of export associations. 5 The WebbPomerene Act has been criticized because it is used by only about
two percent of United States exporters in an era when, although
strong and rising, United States exports often have not increased
enough to overcome OPEC price increases and achieve a trade
surplus. Some observers attribute the scant use of Webb-Pomerene to the slightly uncertain immunity it bestows, to its exclusion
of services, and to the inability and unwillingness of the administering agency, the Federal Trade Commission, to encourage its
use.3 Others contend that, regardless of the wording or administration of the Webb-Pomerene Act, most United States firms simply prefer to compete abroad individually. Arguably, altering the
injury standard of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to emphasize
the goal of protecting United States consumers and exporters will
increase the certainty of immunity for United States exporters
and foreign joint venturers while at the same time making it clear
that foreign purchasers are not protected by United States law.
All of this could be achieved without any increase in federal bureaucracy or surveillance.
This writer can understand the temptations of that approach.
Nevertheless, enforcement experience, years of negotiating common antitrust standards with foreigners, and textual analysis of

the bill dictate the conclusion that tampering with the basic language of the antitrust laws is unjustified, unwise, and dangerous,
and in any event is riskier and less desirable than the alternatives
now before Congress. As John Shenefield testified in congressional hearings, there is no convincing proof that antitrust-or
any other law-significantly hampers United States exports. In
fact, exports are high and growing.3 7 No joint venture of United

33. Id. § 14.28.

34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976)(effective Apr. 10, 1918).
35. J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1, § 19.06.
36. See id. §§ 9.35-.37, 17.09.
37. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on H.R. 2326
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)(statement of John Shenefield) [hereinafter cited as Shenefield Statement].
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States firms to sell abroad has been challenged under the antitrust laws for thirty years.3 8 Only one United States firm has
sought an export-related business review clearance in the last
three years. 9 The Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India4 0 case
probably will be settled without great damage to the defendants.
The questions of when or whether another such case might arise,
and what equities might be present, are highly problematic. The

United States has not altered the wording of its basic antitrust
law for ninety years. The Sherman Act has served well in maintaining free and open competition in both our domestic and foreign commerce. There is no present crisis justifying tampering
with or cutting back this basic statute. At the OECD, the major
free world economic organization, United States officials regularly
participate in the work of a Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices. This Committee has studied many antitrust
problems of common concern and formulated recommendations
intended to advance and harmonize free market principles." In a
1974 report on export cartels, the Committee unanimously recommended that OECD nations require the registration of all joint
export groups. The Committee saw this registration as having two
advantages: it enabled the home government to determine
whether there were domestic effects and it gave the buyer's government notice that a selling group confronted it. 42 Changing the

antitrust laws to make the Webb-Pomerene Act unnecessary
could create a situation in which neither the United States Government nor any foreign government would know precisely which
rival companies were coordinating their exports, export prices, or
38. Davidow, supra note 18, at 898.
39. U.S. Antitrust and Export Trade, Address by Carl Cira, Assistant Chief,
Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, to the World Trade Institute, in

New York City (Oct. 3, 1980).
40. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).

41. See, e.g., CoMMrrrEE OF EXPERTS

ON RESTRICTIVE BusiNEss PRACTICES,

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON CON-

(1979); COMMrITEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
CENTRATION AND COMPETITION POLICY

DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON RESTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES RELATING TO TRADEMARKS

(1978); COMMITFEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRITIVE BusINEss PRACTICES, OR-

GANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON COLLU-

SIVE TENDERING (1976).
42. See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON EXPORT
CARTELS (1974).
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foreign bids. That situation would be inferior to the present in
terms of antitrust policy.
The authors' third proposal is inconsistent with recent United
States activity in the international trade legislation field. During
the past five years, United States officials participated with delegates from eight other nations in negotiating a Set of Principles

and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices."3
This "antitrust code of conduct" was adopted unanimously by a
United Nations conference and enforced by the General Assembly.44 It morally commits all nations to pro-antitrust policies and
to important related principles such as fair and equal treatment
for all companies, whether private or state owned, and respect for
the confidentiality of business secrets. 45 Another principle, particularly important to developing countries, requires nations to eliminate all restrictive business practices that injure international
trade, particularly the trade and development of developing countries. Certain recent United States antitrust cases and decisions,
such as Pfizer v. Government of India,4 have been or may be
helpful to developing countries. It would be anomalous for the
United States to try to reduce the benefits to developing countries of its antitrust laws less than one year after agreeing to a

United Nations antitrust code which represents movement in the
opposite direction. Because that code contains many free market
and fairness doctrines which the United States would like to see
strengthened abroad, it would seem undesirable to create a climate of retreat from the code, especially when the need for doing
so is doubtful.
The denial to foreigners of the use of United States antitrust
laws may hinder United States efforts to expand the scope of legislative jurisdiction. In the context of important but controversial
cases such as those involving the international uranium cartel, a
number of its Western allies have complained about international
application of United States antitrust laws. 47 United States officials have defended those laws and enforcement policies, not only
by reference to international acceptance of the "effects doctrine,"

43. U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/60 (1980).
44. See id.

45.
46.
47.
In re

Id.
434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978).
See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the Government of Australia,
Uranium Antitrust Litig.; 617 F. Supp. 1248 (7th Cir. 1979).
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but also by contending that antitrust enforcement is neutral because it protects those foreigners involved in commerce with the
United States who are victims, as well as penalizing those who are
conspirators. Adoption of Atwood and Brewster's third proposal
would overrule the "effects doctrine" decision and severely undermine the use of this Second rationale to expand the application of
48
United States antitrust laws.
The Atwood-Brewster proposal is especially unnecessary when
one considers the potential harm it would do to foreign relations
and to the campaign for increased acceptance of antitrust principles around the world. The potential effect of the proposal on
protection of legitimate United States interests is of greater significance. Legislation currently under consideration by Congress
demonstrates that the dangers found in the Atwood-Brewster
proposal far outweigh the benefits to be gained from its adoption.
First, addition of the words "direct and substantial" to the Sherman Act could unduly limit circumstances in which the antitrust
laws could redress an injury to important United States interests.
The phrase might be interpreted to preclude challenge to incipient schemes which have yet to injure United States commerce.
Thus, a foreseeability standard is necessary. Second, it is unclear
how the injury standards of the new act would apply to international shipping, international aviation, deep sea mining, or other
offshore activities. Third, the proposed act would not allow recovery by an injured domestic person unless such person is exporting
from or importing into the United States. Present law compensates any significant degree of injury. This change could mean
that joint venturers or affiliates of United States firms investing
abroad would not be protected from any conduct by a United
States foreign subsidiary subject to United States jurisdiction.
Fourth, the Supreme Court ruled that the Webb-Pomerene exception does not protect conspiracies aimed at foreign purchasers
who are using United States AID funds.4 9 The legislation before

Congress would, apparently inadvertently, overrule this decision
and deny protection to United States interests in such a
situation. 0
48. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
49. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199
(1968).

50. See H.R. 2326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 795, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
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It is significant to note that, although supporting certain objectives of this legislation, testimony by the Business Roundtable,
the New York City Bar Association, James Atwood and John
Shenefield mentions nearly all difficulties and objections noted
above.5" Their recommendations would have changed nearly every
significant word of both bills. Nevertheless, this writer does not
believe that all of their suggested changes, taken together, can
cure all of the defects and uncertainties of the proposed bill.
United States courts required many years and many types of
cases to develop rules in this difficult area. It is widely believed
that recent decisions in the Timberlane52 and Mannington Mills5"
cases represent a good approach. This is no time to take the issue
away from the courts and substitute a hastily written text containing both obvious and unforeseen infirmities.
This reviewer's disagreement with the Atwood-Brewster proposal may be summarized as follows: There is no urgent need for

legislation addressing the international application of United
States antitrust laws at this time. Enforcement agencies, courts,
and international committees are working to achieve balance and
harmonization. If the problems are serious enough to warrant
some action, then the most prudent course would be to enact legislation establishing an expert commission to examine, compare,
and draft alternative approaches to any jurisdictional or substantive issues found to justify revision.
Despite disagreements with some of Atwood and Brewster's
recommendations, it is possible to admire and value their thorough exposition of law and policy and their extraordinary efforts
to present a fair and balanced discussion of the policy choices.
Their book will be both useful and influential. Though the courts
and the Congress have been and are likely to be impressed by
their recommendations, this reviewer continues to doubt that
their proposals concerning antitrust jurisdiction will really solve,
or even simplify, the problems in this complex area. In October
1982, Congress passed the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,

51. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearing on H.R. 2326
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 8, 1981)
(statement of J.R. Atwood); see Shenefield Statement, supra note 37.

52. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); J. ATWOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 1.
53. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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title IV54 of which contains text similar to that suggested by

Atwood and Brewster. It remains to be seen whether this legislation will achieve the goal Atwood and Brewster sought.

54. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290,

§§ 401-03.

